Abstract. While a rigorous information flow analysis is a key step in obtaining meaningful end-to-end confidentiality guarantees, one must also permit possibilities for declassification. Sabelfeld and Sands categorized the existing approaches to controlling declassification in their overview along four dimensions and according to four prudent principles [16] . In this article, we propose three novel security conditions for controlling the dimensions where and what, and we explain why these conditions constitute improvements over prior approaches. Moreover, we present a type-based security analysis and, as another novelty, prove a soundness result that considers more than one dimension of declassification.
Introduction
Research on information flow security aims at finding better ways to characterizing and analyzing security requirements concerning aspects of confidentiality and integrity. Regarding confidentiality, the aim of an information flow analysis is to answer: "Can a given program be trusted to operate in an environment where it has read access to secret data and write access to untrusted information sinks?" There is a variety of approaches to information flow security on the level of concrete programs (see [12] for an overview). In the simplest case, one has a two-level policy demanding that information cannot flow from high to low. Secure information flow can then be characterized using the idea underlying noninterference [6] : If low outputs of the program do not depend on high inputs then there is no danger that secret data is leaked to untrusted sinks.
Noninterference provides an intuitively convincing, declarative characterization of information flow security. However, there are security mechanisms and application scenarios that need some information to flow from high to low. For instance, a password-based authentication mechanism necessarily reveals some information about the secret password, decryption relies on a dependence between a cipher-text and the secret plain-text that it encodes, and electronic commerce requires secret data to be released after it has been paid for. For making information flow security compatible with such requirements, one must permit exceptions in the security policy. But, this raises the question how to control that one does not introduce possibilities for unintended information leakage.
For clarifying the intentions underlying the various approaches to controlling information release, three dimensions were introduced in [9] : what information is declassified, who can control whether declassification occurs, and where can declassification happen. In [16] , Sabelfeld and Sands develop a taxonomy that categorizes the existing approaches along these dimensions 1 and propose four prudent principles of controlling declassification. The taxonomy clarified the relationship between the various approaches, and it revealed some anomalies and misconceptions that had previously gone unnoticed. Another interesting outcome is that each approach mainly aims at a single dimension and does not provide adequate control for any of the respective other dimensions.
In this article, our scope is controlling the what and where of declassification in a type-based security analysis. In summary, our research contributions are:
-A novel security characterization for controlling where declassification occurs. Our property WHERE is similar to intransitive noninterference [9] , but WHERE satisfies the prudent principles of declassification from [16] , including monotonicity, which is not satisfied by intransitive noninterference. -Two novel security characterizations for controlling what is declassified. Our properties WHAT 1 and WHAT 2 are similar to selective dependency [3] and its descendants (e.g., [13] ), but, unlike these properties, WHAT 1 and WHAT 2 are applicable to concurrent programs. Lifting a security characterization from a sequential to a concurrent setting is often not straightforward, in particular, one must address the danger of internal timing leaks [15] . -A security type system for analyzing the information flow in concurrent programs under policies that permit controlled exceptions. Our type system localizes where declassification occurs and controls what is declassified. We prove soundness results with respect to each of our properties WHERE, WHAT 1 , and WHAT 2 . To our knowledge, the only other formal soundness result for an information flow type system that considers where and what is the one by Li and Zdancewic [7] . However, they aim at sequential programs and mainly at controlling the what dimension [16] .
In our project, we gained some further insights on controlling declassification. For instance, our property WHAT 1 is compositional but does not satisfy the monotonicity principle, while our property WHAT 2 is not compositional but satisfies monotonicity. We found that, when controlling the what dimension of declassification, one faces a fundamental difficulty when attempting to satisfy compositionality as well as monotonicity (see Sect. 3.2). While using the prudent principles of declassification as a sanity check for our security characterizations, we found that formalizing the informal descriptions of the principles from [16] is not always completely straightforward, and in some cases more than one formalization is sensible. As an example, we provide two alternative formalizations of the conservativity principle for WHERE (see Theorem 2).
We propose a novel characterization of information flow security that controls where declassification can occur. It is ensured that declassification is localized to specific parts of the security policy as well as to specific parts of the computation. Computation steps are modeled by labeled transitions between configurations of the form | C 1 . . . C n , s| . Here, the state s is a mapping from program variables to values, and the vector models a pool of n threads that concurrently execute the commands C 1 , . . . , C n ∈ Com, respectively. For simplicity, we do not distinguish between commands and command vectors of length one in the notation and use the term program for referring to commands as well as to command vectors. We distinguish ordinary computation steps, which are modeled by a transition relation o , from declassification steps, which are modeled by a family of relations (
. Given a policy (D, ≤, ), the intuition is that an ordinary transition must strictly obey the ordering ≤ (which means that information may only flow upwards according to ≤), while declassification steps may violate this ordering by downgrading information from the domains in D 1 to the domain D 2 . However, such violations must comply with the relation .
Preliminaries
Given a set Var of program variables, a domain assignment is a function dom : Var → D. By assigning a security domain dom(Id ) to each variable, it creates a connection between the configurations in a computation and the security policy. Taking the perspective of an observer in a security domain D, two states s, t are indistinguishable if all variables at or below this domain have the same value. In the following, let (D, ≤, ) be a policy and dom be a domain assignment. We adopt the naming conventions used above: D denotes a security domain, s and t denote states, C denotes a command, and V and W denote command vectors.
The PER approach [14] characterizes information flow security based on indistinguishability relations on programs. Two programs are indistinguishable for a security domain D if running them in two D-equal states reveals no secrets to an observer in D, unless this is explicitly permitted by the given security policy. The D-indistinguishability relation is not reflexive. It only relates programs to themselves if they have secure information flow. 
For two commands C, C ′ ∈ Com, being strongly D-bisimilar (C ≅ D C ′ ) means that each computation step that is possible for C in a state s can be simulated in each D-equal state s ′ by a computation step of C ′ , where the resulting programs W and W ′ are strongly D-bisimilar and the resulting states t and t ′ are D-equal. As a consequence, strong security enforces the flow of information to comply with the ordering ≤ without permitting any exceptions. The strong security condition is the weakest security definition that is scheduler independent and is preserved under parallel and sequential composition [11] . Technically, the former is a consequence of requiring strongly D-bisimilar programs to execute in lock-step.
A Novel Characterization of Flow Security
In this article, we propose several characterizations of information flow security that permit declassification while controlling it in a particular dimension. Our security conditions are derived using the PER approach, and each of them is presented as a variant of the strong security condition. We use the terms whatsecurity and where-security to indicate in which dimension declassification is controlled and distinguish different variants for the same dimension with indices.
Definition 4 (WHERE).
A strong (D, )-bisimulation is a symmetric relation R on command vectors of equal size that satisfies the entire formula in Declassification is possible as t and t ′ in Fig. 1 need not be D-equal. However, such exceptions are constrained by the formula with dark-gray background:
-steps causing declassification must be declassification transitions
is observable, and it may only reveal differences between s and s ′ that can be observed from domains in D 1 .
That is, where-security localizes exceptions, within a computation, to the declassification steps and, within an MLS policy, to where permits it. In this respect, our condition is similar to intransitive noninterference [9] , but the two security conditions are not identical. Most importantly, where-security satisfies all prudent principles of declassification (see Sect. 2.3), unlike intransitive noninterference [16] . Technically, the differences become apparent in the definition of the respectively underlying notion of a strong D-bisimulation. In [9] , firstly, declassification steps downgrade information from a single domain D 1 (rather than from a set of domains D 1 ), secondly, declassification steps may only make information flow according to the relation (rather than according to ∪ ≤), and thirdly, each transition must be simulated by a transition with the identical annotation (while Fig. 1 requires nothing about the labels of the transition |C
The first two relaxations are helpful for a flexible combination with a control of what is downgraded. The third relaxation is crucial for satisfying the principle monotonicity of release (see Sect. 2.3).
Prudent Principles and Compositionality
To investigate our security definition more concretely, we augment the multithreaded while language MWL from [15] with a declassifying assignment:
We use B and Exp for denoting Boolean-valued and integer-valued expressions, respectively. The language E for expressions shall not be specified here. We only assume that the evaluation of expressions is atomic and deterministic. That expression Exp evaluates to value n in state s is denoted by |Exp, s| ↓ n. We assume a function sources that returns for an expression the set of security domains on which the value of the expression possibly depends or, more formally,
The semantics of MWL instantiate the transition relations o and
transition where D 1 = sources(Exp) and D 2 = dom(Id ). Assignments, skip, conditionals, loops, and fork cause ordinary transitions. The statement fork(CV ) spawns the threads C V where C is the designated main thread. If threads are created within the sub-command C 1 of a sequential composition C 1 ; C 2 then C 2 is executed after the main thread has terminated. A formal definition of the semantics is provided in Appendix A.
Sabelfeld and Sands propose the following principles of declassification [16] :
Semantic consistency: The (in)security of a program is invariant under semantics-preserving transformations of declassification-free subprograms. Conservativity: The security of a program with no declassifications is equivalent to noninterference. Monotonicity of release: Adding further declassifications to a secure program cannot render it insecure. Non-occlusion: The presence of a declassification operation cannot mask other covert information leaks.
We now validate our security characterization against these prudent principles. As suggested in [16] , we define semantic equivalence between programs by ≅ = ≅ high , where ≅ high is the strong high-bisimulation for the single-domain policy ({high}, {(high, high)}). A context C is a program where the hole • may occur as an atomic sub-command. We use C[C] to denote the program that one obtains by replacing each occurrence of • with C. The proof of the following and all other theorems in this article will be provided in an extended version.
Strong security follows from where-security not only if there are no declassification operations in a program, but also if the policy does not permit any exceptions. In the other direction, where-security is a weakening of strong security.
Theorem 2 (Conservativity).
1. If = ∅ and V ∈ WHERE then V is strongly secure. 2. If no declassification occurs in V and V ∈ WHERE then V is strongly secure. 3. If V is strongly secure then V ∈ WHERE.
Monotonicity holds with respect to the exceptions permitted by the policy and also with respect to the declassification operations in the program.
Theorems 1-3 demonstrate that our novel security characterization satisfies the first three principles of declassification from [16] . A formal proof of the fourth prudent principle is impossible. Such a proof would require a formal characterization of secure information flow as a reference point, which we do not have a priori as Definition 4 defines a characterization based on an intuitive understanding.
The following compositionality results hold for WHERE. We define expressions Exp, Exp
Controlling Declassification in the Dimension what
We propose two characterizations of information flow security that control what is declassified. Each of them is a natural adaptation of the idea underlying Cohen's selective dependency [3] (and its descendants like, e.g., delimited release [13] or abstract noninterference [5] ) to a multi-threaded language.
2 As usual, the proposition does not hold if one replaces sub-commands with declassification commands. For instance, consider C = •, C = [l:=h], and C ′ = l:=h for the two-domain policy where dom(h) = high, dom(l) = low , and high low . 
That is, an escape hatch (D ′
Two Novel Characterizations of Flow Security
Our conditions WHAT 1 and WHAT 2 constitute adaptations of strong security (Definition 3) that permit declassification while controlling what is declassified. For illustrating the first modification, let H = {(low, h1+h2)}, C 1 = l:=h1+h2, and C 2 = [l:=h1+h2]. Neither C 1 nor C 2 is strongly secure (take low -equal states that differ in the value of h1+h2), but both are what 1 -secure. Recall that what 1 -security does not aim at localizing where declassification occurs and, hence, declassifying assignments are treated like usual assignments (unlike in Sect. 2).
For illustrating the second modification, let C 3 = h1:=0; [l:=h1+h2]. This program leaks the initial value of h2 and, hence, does not comply with the security policy. In fact, this program is not what 1 -secure due to the requirement t = 
Unfortunately, what 1 -security does not satisfy the monotonicity principle (see Sect. 3.2). As a solution, we propose another security characterization.
Definition 8 (WHAT 2 ).
A program V has secure information flow while complying with the restrictions what can be declassified if ∀D :
Note that Definition 8 is also based on the notion of a strong (D, H)-bisimulation. The difference from Definition 7 is the existential quantification over H ′ . This relaxation could be exploited in a security analysis by treating expressions in escape hatches like usual expressions if they are not used for declassification. Another effect of the relaxation is that the monotonicity principle is satisfied.
Prudent Principles and Compositionality
We now validate the security characterizations of this section against the prudent principles (see Sect. 2.3) and use the results to compare the characterizations.
Interestingly, WHAT 1 and WHAT 2 are preserved even if one replaces arbitrary sub-programs with semantically equivalent ones.
Theorem 5 (Strong semantic consistency). Let C, C
′ be programs (possibly containing declassification commands).
Both security conditions satisfy the conservativity principle. Additionally, what 2 -security is a relaxation of strong security. Due to the strict handling of variables in escape hatches, what 1 -security is not a relaxation of strong security if H = ∅.
Theorem 6 (Conservativity). 
Theorem 7 (Monotonicity of Release).
Example 2. Consider C 4 = h1:=0. Intuitively, this program has secure information flow for the two-domain policy (where dom(h1) = high), and it also satisfies the strong security condition. For any set H, we obtain
is not what 1 -secure for H = {(low, h1+h2)} as it updates the variable h1, which occurs in the escape hatch.
Example 2 demonstrates that WHAT 1 does not satisfy monotonicity. The problem is that the condition V ≅ H D V does not permit the updating of variables that occur in some escape hatch in H. While such updates might lead to an information leak in subsequent assignments, they are harmless given that the variable only occurs in escape hatches that are never used for declassification. This problem does not arise with WHAT 2 as one can choose H ′ such that it only contains escape hatches that are used.
While we are confident that our characterizations WHAT 1 and WHAT 2 are adequate, a formal proof of the non-occlusion principle is not possible as we are defining what security means (as already explained for WHERE in Sect. 2.3) .
However, we can analyze the compositionality of our security characterizations. We define expressions Exp, Exp
if the policy has a domain low and B ≡
Due to the existential quantification of H ′ in Definition 8, WHAT 2 is not compositional. This is illustrated by the following example. In summary, none of our two characterizations WHAT 1 and WHAT 2 is superior to the respective other characterization. While WHAT 1 is compositional (see Corollary 1) but does not satisfy the monotonicity principle (see Example 2), WHAT 2 satisfies monotonicity (see Theorem 7) but is not compositional (see Example 3). It would be desirable to obtain a security characterization that is compositional and that satisfies the monotonicity principle. Unfortunately, one faces a fundamental difficulty when one also wants to control the what dimension of declassification. As discussed in Example 3, C 3 = C 4 ; C 2 and C 5 = fork(C 4 C 2 ) both violate the two-level policy for the set H = {(low , h1+h2)} and, hence, these programs should not be considered as what-secure. However, being able to declassify the expression h1+h2 is the very purpose of the escape hatch (low , h1+h2) and, hence, the program 
A Sound Type System for Information Flow Security
We present a security type system that can be used as a basis for automating the information flow analysis. The type system provides an integrated control of the where dimension and of the what dimension of declassification. In the following, let (D, ≤, , H) be a policy and dom be a domain assignment.
The core of the type system is the rule for declassification commands as this is where declassification actually occurs. Our security characterizations in Sections 2 and 3 provide some guidance for developing such a rule, but there are still some pitfalls that one must avoid. As an example, consider the rule below, where Var (Exp) denotes the set of identifiers occurring in the expression Exp:
In the above rule, the second premise ensures that declassification complies with or, in other words, that the where of declassification is localized according to the policy. The third premise ensures that executing the declassification command in (D, H)-equal states leads to D-equal states. Finally, the fourth premise controls the information flow into variables that occur in escape hatches. Nevertheless, the above typing rule is not sound in a compositional security analysis. For instance, Rule (1) allows one to derive [h1:=0] as well as [l:=h1+h2], but the sequential composition of these commands leaks the initial value of h2 and, hence, does not comply with the two-level policy for H = {(low , h1+h2)}. In order to avoid such problems, the rule also needs to ensure that a declassification does not enable information leakage in assignments that are executed subsequently. 4 A solution would be to forbid assignments to variables that occur in escape hatches that contain complex expressions (i.e., expressions that are not identifiers). This solution can be implemented by adding the following condition as another premise to Rule (1):
S i∈{1,...,m} Di Fig. 3 . Type rules for expressions In the type system, we use the judgment ⊢ Exp : D ′ instead of the function sources. Intuitively, ⊢ Exp :
and that if D ∈ D ′ then there is a variable Id ∈ Var (Exp) with dom(Id ) = D. The judgment is defined formally by the rules in Fig. 3 , and it fulfills the requirements for the function sources as the following theorem shows.
To improve the readability of the typing rules, we introduce a judgment Id ← Exp. Intuitively, this judgment captures that Exp may be assigned to Id in a declassifying assignment. The following formal definition is based on the conditions that we have motivated earlier in this section.
Definition 10. We define the judgment Id ← Exp by
The integrated security type system for commands is presented in Fig. 4 . Recall that we implicitly assume (D, ≤, , H) to be an MLS policy controlling the where and what of declassification. To make the policy explicit, we use the notation ⊢ D,≤, ,H V for denoting that ⊢ V is derivable with the typing rules. Note that the rule for conditionals has two semantic side conditions. In this respect our presentation of the typing rules is similar to the one of the typing rules for intransitive noninterference in [9] . In that article, it is demonstrated how such semantic side conditions can be syntactically approximated by safe approximation relations in a sound way, and similar constructions are possible for our side conditions. Moreover, the premises of the typing rules for assignments and declassification involve the judgment Id ← Exp. Due to space limitations, we also omit the fairly straightforward syntactic approximation of Definition 10. % make check result public if check then fmail:=mail % copy the mail into an auxiliary variable else fmail:=0 fi; % set the auxiliary variable to a dummy value [rmail:=fmail] % forward mail to reader Theorem 10 (Soundness of Security Type System).
That is, the type system is sound with respect to the security characterizations introduced in Sect. 2 and 3. In particular, the what and where of declassification in type-correct programs complies with the respectively given policy.
An Exemplary Security Analysis
In our application scenario, an e-mail arrives via a network and is forwarded to a user. Before the user reads an e-mail in the mail reader, the e-mail must pass a filter. The filter shall check whether the e-mail is infected by malware and shall also make the result of the check publicly available, e.g., to permit the computation of statistics about the infection rate of incoming e-mail. For this scenario, we can distinguish four security domains, a domain for the network, a domain for the filter, a domain for the mail reader, and a domain for public information. The main security requirements are that all e-mail from the network passes the filter before reaching the reader and that no e-mails are made public. The resulting security policy is depicted in Fig. 5 . The first security requirement is captured by this policy as the only path from domain network to domain reader is via domain filter. The second requirement is captured by the set of escape hatches as the only escape hatch with variable mail as expression has reader as target domain. The first requirement concerns the where dimension while the second requirement concerns the what dimension of declassification. A simple example for a filter program is depicted in Fig. 6 . Note that declassifying assignments are used to declassify the result of the malware check (which depends on the variable mail) to domain public and to declassify an incoming mail to domain reader. The filter program forwards mail only if the malware check was negative. While this what aspect of declassification is not captured in our security policy, it would also be possible to define an MLS policy that captures this aspect. We refrain from pursuing such possibilities here.
An analysis of the filter program with the typing rules from Fig. 4 yields that the program is type correct (three applications of the rule for sequential composition, one application of the rule for conditionals, three applications of the rule for assignments, and two applications of the rule for declassifying assignments). Theorem 10 allows us to conclude that the program in Fig. 6 is where-secure, what 1 -secure, and what 2 -secure for the MLS policy in Fig. 5 .
Related Work
Declassification is a current topic in language-based information flow security and there already is a variety of approaches to controlling declassification [16] . In the what dimension this survey lists, for instance, [8, 13] , and in the where/when dimension, for instance, [4, 10, 9] . Non-disclosure is a recent approach in the where dimension that aims at multi-threaded programs [2, 1] . The idea is to expand the flow relation ≤ according to annotations at the executing sub-programs. A given expansion of ≤ localizes where declassification can occur in the program. The construction of expansions implicitly assumes that the exceptions that are permitted correspond to a transitive relation, an assumption that we do not need to make for WHERE.
Very few approaches limit declassification in more than one dimension. According to [16] , relaxed noninterference [7] mainly addresses the what dimensions, but it also addresses some aspects of the where dimension. Relaxed noninterference has a syntactic flavor as declassification may only involve syntactically equivalent λ-terms. 5 While this approach appears quite restrictive, the benefit is that one obtains some localization in the program as declassification can only happen where a particular syntactic expression occurs. Since relaxed noninterference only considers a two-level policy, there is no notion of limiting where declassification can occur in the flow policy.
According to [16] , abstract noninterference [5] mainly addresses the whatdimension. In fact, it is a generalization of selective dependency like delimited release [13] , WHAT 1 , and WHAT 2 . However, abstract noninterference also has similarities to robust declassification [17] , which is a prominent representative for controlling the who dimension.
Another aspect, in which our work differs from many other approaches, is that we address concurrent programs. Lifting a security analysis from a sequential to a concurrent setting is often nontrivial as one must consider the possibility of races and address the danger of internal timing leaks. For an overview on approaches addressing concurrency, we can only refer to [12] due to space restrictions.
Conclusion
While a number of approaches to controlling declassification in a language-based security analysis has been proposed in recent years, little work has addressed controlling multiple dimensions of declassification in an integrated fashion.
The aim of our investigation was to more adequately control the where and what of declassification. For controlling the where dimension, we proposed the condition WHERE, and we proved that it is compositional and satisfies the prudent principles of declassification (unlike, e.g., intransitive noninterference). For controlling what, we proposed the conditions WHAT 1 and WHAT 2 , and we identified an inherent trade-off between the monotonicity principle and compositionality. To our knowledge, the soundness result for our type system is the first such result that clearly identifies which aspects of where and what are controlled.
The starting point for deriving our novel security characterizations was the strong security condition. The advantages of this condition include that it is compositional and robust with respect to choices of the scheduler (see [15] for a more detailed analysis). The strong security condition also rules out dangers of internal leaks in concurrent programming without making any assumptions about the possibilities of race conditions in a program. As a consequence, this condition is somewhat restrictive, which is technically due to the use of a strong bisimulation relation that requires a lock-step execution of related programs. While a less restrictive baseline characterization would be desirable, we do not know of any convincing solutions for controlling the where dimension in multithreaded programs based on a less restrictive security condition.
